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Abstract:
A prolonged confrontation between Yahoo! Inc. and French anti-racism activists who ask for
the removal of Nazi items from auction sites as well as restricted access to neo-Nazis sites is
analyzed. We present the case and its development up to the decision of Yahoo! Inc. to
remove the items from yahoo.com following a French court’s verdict against the firm. Using a
business ethics approach, we distinguish the legal, technical, philosophical and managerial
issues involved in the case and their management by Yahoo! We conclude on the difficulty of
governing relations with society from corporate and legal affairs departments at the
headquarters level, and on the clash of two visions over the regulation of social freedom.
Keywords:
e-business; e-ethics; auctions; legal compliance; Internet regulation; freedom of expression;
media crisis.
                                                
1 Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 93 542 27 23; Fax: +34 93 542 17 46; E-mail:
marc.lemenestrel@econ.upf.es.Yahoo! on Trial – November 2001 2
Introduction
The crisis which shook Yahoo! Inc. and its French subsidiary in the early spring of 2000,
when a Paris-based anti-hate activist launched a media and judicial attack on its business
practices – specifically, the sale of Nazi items on Yahoo American auction sites – can with
hindsight be seen as inevitable.   When it erupted, concern over dubious content carried by
Internet sites was evident worldwide, in spheres ranging from online and print media to
political elites.  Yet the Yahoo! case marked the first time that the Internet generated a
profound conflict between a U.S. company and a foreign country.
The case can be read as a landmark in a continuing trend – namely, rising pressure on
business to assume responsibility for the social consequences of commercial activities.  And it
raises several global business issues, including: multi-jurisdictional compliance, the technical
specificity of the Internet, opposing conceptions of freedom of expression, the nature of e-
business, coordination between headquarters and a foreign subsidiary, leadership, and
relations with domestic and international media.
We contend that a business ethics approach can provide valuable insight into these issues.  By
a “business ethics approach”, we mean an effort to understand the social responsibility of
firms beyond the simple respect of legal constraints. In this case, the laws governing the
protagonists, like their ethical positions, were in conflict.  It is thus of little use to contend that
a firm in such a situation may simply go about making profits within the law.  It may be more
useful to ask whether the firm concentrates on respecting its principles or on gaining a
practical benefit, and whether it is confronting or aligning itself with social pressure.
It is crucial to note that in this case, Yahoo!  adopted mostly principled attitudes.  The
company’s actions cannot be explained solely by a more or less cynical search for profits.
Our research suggests, on the contrary, that Yahoo! based its strategy on a sincere belief that
it was participating in the making of a new (and better) society. Yet the principal results of
this stance were sustained damage to the firm’s brand, and a humiliating defeat in the French
courts.  One might conclude that a company should not focus only on doing good.
In Part One, we review the context and history of the affair, beginning with a rising
international wave of protests against hate literature on the Internet in the summer of 1999,
and continuing through its judicial developments.  In Part Two, we analyze  Yahoo!’s
responses to the different issues raised by the case, in terms of principled versus pragmatic
attitudes, and conflict or alignment with social pressure.  Two questions concern us: Could
Yahoo! could have handled this affair in a way that generated less social conflict? And can a
firm balance the defense of its principles with its economic interests – especially when, as in
this case, the threatened principles embody the firm’s vision of its future?Yahoo! on Trial – November 2001 3
Part One: Yahoo! versus Licra: History of a Clash
1.1  Protests Against Hate For Sale On The Web, Aug. 1999-Feb. 2000
At the end of the last decade, the appearance of objects with a Nazi provenance in e-
commerce sites became an object of outraged protest.  Thus online booksellers
Barnesandnoble.com and Amazon.com stopped selling Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf to German
customers in August 1999, after the Simon Wiesenthal Center of Los Angeles notified the
German Ministry of Justice that the companies might be violating the Federal Republic's laws
against hate literature.
2   Three months later the Wiesenthal Center attacked what it called the
U.S.-based online auctioneer eBay's “current policy of marketing Nazi memorabilia”, adding
that it intended to ask German leaders to “review existing anti-Nazi laws and possible legal
actions.”  Executives at eBay argued that its German subsidiary “adheres to German law and
does not allow the posting of Nazi items” – which is legal in the U.S. – and that they were
“hesitant to perform the role of censor.”
3   Similar arguments would later be employed by
Yahoo! Inc.
In February 2000, a New York-based anti-hate group, BiasHELP, asked eBay to remove all
listings of items related to the Ku Klux Klan, arguing that “the incredible size and reach of
[eBay's] audience creates special responsibilities.”  Apparently hoping to forestall further
protests, eBay announced that its site “will not become a platform for those who promote
hatred toward their fellow man.”  The company's new policy attempted to balance the
interests of legitimate collectors against the concerns of protestors:
Relics of groups such as the KKK or Nazi Germany may be listed on  eBay,
provided that they are at least 50 years old, and the listing is not used as a
platform to glorify or promote the organization or its values...  eBay will
judiciously disallow listings or items that promote hatred, violence or racial
intolerance, including items that promote organizations with such views.  eBay
will review listings that are brought to its attention by the community, and will
look at the entire listing to determine whether it falls within this rule.
Yahoo! Inc. also felt the rising heat.  On Feb. 23, 2000, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL),
an American non-profit group founded in 1913, accused Yahoo! Inc. of hosting an entire
category of “White Pride and Racialism” clubs.  Noting that Yahoo “Terms of Service”
agreement prohibited users from posting content of a “racially, ethnically or otherwise
objectionable” nature, the ADL demanded that Yahoo! cease to “ignore its own policy and
us.”  Two days later, the ADL triumphantly reported that Yahoo!  had “apologized for not
                                                
2 It is worth noting that a skilled Internet user could nonetheless find alternate sources for these materials, as
the online magazine Salon reported: “While German extremists can't buy their books from the Internet's biggest
vendors, they can find them if they dig a little deeper.” (See Craig Offman, “Hate Books Still for Sale on the
Web.”  Salon.com, August 17, 1999.)  Indeed, the impossibility of enforcing absolute censorship on the Internet
is a given among experts interviewed for this article, including all protagonists in the Yahoo! affair.
3 One eBay manager compared the Center, known for pursuit of war criminals, to “a Nazi Gestapo force [that
wants to] police everything that goes on the market.”  Needless to say, the irony of his remark was not
appreciated.  See Ed Ritchie, “No Tolerance for Nazi Items .” Auctionwatch.com, Dec. 1, 1999.Yahoo! on Trial – November 2001 4
addressing the violations sooner,” and had encouraged the ADL's Internet Monitoring Unit to
report such abuses.
The responses of Yahoo! and eBay reflected an emerging consensus among leaders of the
New Economy, to deal with offensive materials largely through a policy of “notice and take
down.”  While refusing to establish broad pre-emptive standards for user-generated content,
Yahoo!  and  eBay removed materials that aroused significant protests from users or
spokespeople for legitimate causes.  Thus Internet companies could hope to avoid both heavy-
handed government regulation that might harm their industry, and accusations of censoring
their users.
1.2  The Public and Governments Intervene Against Hate on the Web,
Jan.-Feb. 2000
Meanwhile, the  issue of Internet hate steadily widened into judicial and political spheres
around the world.  In January 2000, the United Kingdom's Internet Watch Foundation (IWF:
www.iwf.org.uk), an industry self-regulatory group established in 1996, announced that it was
extending its authority to hate materials on the Internet.  Under an agreement with the British
government, the IWF investigated complaints received on its hotline, to determine if pages on
a given site contained illegal hate content.  If so, the IWF would ask the service provider to
take down the site. Providers that complied were guaranteed immunity from criminal
prosecution, though not from civil actions.
For British civil liberties activists like Chris Ellison, founder of Internet Freedom, the IWF's
goal was to “extend their ability to censor,” at a moment when the Blair government sought to
improve its “politically correct” image.
4 But for IWF chairman Roger Darlington, self-
regulation, and not censorship, was the issue:  “We have no formal legal powers – Parliament
hasn’t legislated this.  The strength [of the IWF] is that the industry is more sensitive to a
body it set up, and it works faster than a public body.  The weakness is that [its actions] could
still be challenged in the courts.”
5
Government leaders in other countries were calling for stricter regulation of Internet hate.  On
Jan. 27, 2000, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, inaugurating the first International
Forum on the Holocaust in Stockholm, asked for international cooperation to keep neo-Nazis
off the Internet.
6
The debate over misuse of the Internet was particularly intense in France, where a new “Law
on the Liberty of Communication” was under debate in the National Assembly.  The law held
Internet service providers responsible for illegal content that transited by their servers, exactly
as printers could be held responsible under French law if the authors and publishers of a
defamatory printed work could not be located.
7 Noting that access providers were
                                                
4  Lakshmi  Chaudry, “British ISPs Crack Down on Hate.”  Libertarian Alliance, Jan. 25, 2000 (via
www.codoh.com).
5 Interview with the authors, March 30, 2001. The whole interview is reproduced in Le Menestrel et Al.
(2001a, exhibit 1). Useful information can be found on Roger Darlington personal site:
http://members.tripod.co.uk/rogerdarlington/index.html.
6 Kim Gamel, “Forum: Keep Neo-Nazis From Web.” Associated Press, Jan. 27, 2000.
7 This is the substance of Article 43 of the Loi du 1er août 2000 « relative à la liberté de communication ».
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increasingly accused of promoting “defamation, pedophilia, violations of authors’ rights, and
incitation to racial hatred,” the daily newspaper Libération remarked that they “are trapped, at
once guarantors of the freedom of expression and subject to the pressure of plaintiffs.”
8  This
was the precise quandary into which Yahoo! was now plunged.
1.3  An activist sounds the alert: February 2000
Marc Knobel is a Paris-based researcher who tracked neo-Nazi groups for the Wiesenthal
Center, and whose Jewish ancestors, he recalled in a bitter euphemism, had “tasted fascism in
every flavor.”
9  Since 1997, when he began conducting his research online, he had become
convinced that the Internet was changing the landscape of hate for the worse. Said Knobel:
The Internet didn't invent anything. These groups existed, they distributed their
propaganda, forged bonds among themselves, met with each other. That hasn't
changed.  But before Internet, they were largely confined to specific geographical
zones.  What's new is the very great ease which allows me today to connect to the
web pages and sites created by these groups, and to see what they distribute, who
they are, what they're doing, and to have access to their very essence.
He acknowledged that this shift had greatly facilitated his own research. And yet, said
Knobel, “I would prefer, frankly, to never see a site that was created by the extreme right.
Every time we leave open ground to the extreme right, it moves in.”
10
One day in February 2000, an American acquaintance called Knobel to ask if he were aware
that yahoo.com’s auction site was selling Nazi goods.  Knobel said that until then, he regarded
Yahoo! as “the great community of  Internauts where you find everything right away, and
even better, for free. A wonderful new world.”  On yahoo.com, after typing the word “nazi”
into the auction site’s search window, he discovered 800 items for sale.  He was particularly
shocked by a box of Zyklon-B, the poison gas used at Auschwitz, identified as a “museum-
quality replica.”
11  Though Knobel was aware that visitors to Yahoo site, and not the firm,
were responsible for the objects on auction, he blamed the company for allowing the sale. In
conjunction with a lawyer,  Stéphane  Lilti, he decided to pressure Yahoo!  to stop these
auctions, through the media:
I thought I could make Yahoo! understand that it’s no big problem if they take
these things off the site. They’d get the idea, they’d contact me. I said to myself,
‘They’re Americans, they’ll understand that the French see this differently, that it
                                                                                                                                                        
French model Estelle Hallyday discovered her photographs on an unauthorized  site that used altern.org’s server
and sued.  In effect, the new law confirmed and extended that jurisprudence.
8 Florent Latrive, « Les hébergeurs priés de sévir ».  Libération, April 7, 2000 (via www.liberation.com).
9 Marc Knobel's quotes are drawn from an interview with the authors, February 6, 2001, and from follow-up
telephone calls, unless otherwise indicated.
10 Recent research on extreme right movements in Europe supports Knobel’s opinion; France’s National
Front and its more radical satellites, for example, were the first political forces in France to establish a presence
on the Internet.  The promotional power of their websites can be disputed, but their utility as a communications
tool within the movements seems clear.
11  Comments Greg Wrenn, Yahoo associate general counsel for international affairs: “The vendors didn’t
say, ‘Throw this at your Jewish neighbor and scare him.’  Nothing to indicate they were offered by Nazi
supporters – or not offered to legitimate collectors who don’t want to forget the atrocities committed in World
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isn’t good to sell this stuff. It’s their responsibility and it’s in their power to do
something.’  And I said to myself – not to them –‘Maybe they will. I’ll give them
two months.’
Knobel convinced the UEJF (Union of Jewish French Students), and the LICRA
(International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism), where he sat on the executive
board, to join his cause.  Their press campaign began on Feb. 17, 2000 in the weekly Paris-
Match, which announced its “discovery” of Nazi goods on the Internet – “nearly 500 on
Yahoo!, and over 3,500 on eBay,” noted the reporters.  An illustration of a Waffen SS, a
member of the Nazi party’s armed forces, was captioned: “On Yahoo! Auctions: A mouse pad
glorifying the SS troops.”  The article ended with a threat from Knobel: “It’s up to Internet
companies to regulate themselves.  If not, we’ll launch a boycott [of Yahoo!].”
12  The LICRA
did so two days later, but the boycott had no immediate measurable effect on visits to
yahoo.fr.
A subsequent article in L’Express was read with foreboding at Yahoo! France, the American
firm’s subsidiary.  Its General Director, Philippe  Guillanton, contacted Yahoo! Inc.
immediately.  No contact was made with the LICRA.
On April 5, 2000, Yahoo! France received a registered letter from the LICRA, warning that if
the auctions of Nazi objects did not cease within eight days, charges would be filed in Paris.
The letter was forwarded to Yahoo! Inc. for reply. Three days later, before Yahoo! Inc. could
prepare its answer, Yahoo! France learned from the press that it and its parent were being
sued.
1.4  Yahoo! Stands Accused: April-May 2000
Under a special procedure called the  reféré, which allows a judge to ordain immediate
preventive measures against a defendant without a full trial, the plaintiffs demanded that
Yahoo! be fined 100,000 Euros ($90,000) for every day the sales of Nazi objects continued.
Further demands included removing all links to “negationist” (Holocaust denial) websites
from Yahoo! France, and eliminating two sites, including one in French, that offered the text
of Mein Kampf on Yahoo! Inc.’s geocities.com subsidiary.
Greg Wrenn immediately faxed LICRA president Patrick Gaubert, taking a principled stance:
Yahoo! applauds the mission of your organization and in no way does Yahoo!
endorse anti-Semitism or racism of any sort.  In fact, as you may recall, Yahoo!
France has cooperated extensively this year with LICRA regarding your concerns
about Nazi-related sites
13…. Within the bounds of the law of the 23 different
countries in which our international properties are located, we promote freedom of
expression and choice and Yahoo!  believes it should not act as a political
censor…in the U.S., the removal of such items would be considered censorship
and treated by many as more offensive than the isolated postings themselves.
                                                
12François Labrouillère and Laurent Léger, «  Quand Yahoo et eBay deviennent les supermarchés des
souvenirs nazis», Paris-Match No. 2647, February 17, 2000.
13 Prior to Knobel’s press campaign, Wrenn had contacted Inktomi, which provides Yahoo! France with web
page search results, to ensure that the sub-contractor would remove sites considered illegal in France from its
index.  “It’s an automatic system – they’d find French-language sites and index them,” explained Wrenn.  “They
don’t do human reviews.”  The group at the origin of the complaint, which was successfully resolved, was the
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Following the first dispatches on the case, French online media, notably Transfert.net, began
what turned into extensive coverage of the affair, including the posting of judicial documents.
But outside France, coverage was non-existent, with the significant exception of a major
Israeli newspaper, the Jerusalem Post.
14  Only scattered online media, like  ZDNet News,
picked up the Reuters coverage, while other leading online news  soures, like  Hotwired,
remained silent.  Market analysts in London and New York apparently saw no significance in
the case, which appeared in not a single analyst’s report through the spring.  Yahoo! Inc.
indirectly contributed to the silence, by following its established policy of refusing to
comment about ongoing judicial proceedings.
1.5  The First Hearings: May 15-22, 2000
At the first hearing in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris on May 15, defending
counsel Christophe Pecard argued that “Internet users who go to Yahoo.com undertake a
virtual voyage to the U.S.,” and so no offense could be said to take place in France.  In any
case, it would be technically impossible for Yahoo! to block all access to its sites from
France, noted Pecnard.  Consequently, he declared, “The plaintiff has picked the wrong
enemy, and finds himself, unjustly and in spite of himself, putting Internet on trial instead of
neo-Nazi propaganda.”
15  Lilti counter-attacked that “Yahoo! Inc. has not seen fit, since the
delivery of the lawsuit, to remedy the problems that were denounced, which it maintains in
full awareness.”
16
Jean-Jacques Gomez, who presided over the case, was concerned by two major points: Did
French law apply to the case?  And if so, did his court possess the means to apply it?
 17  On
May 22, Judge Gomez answered yes to the first question: “In permitting the visualization in
France of [Nazi] objects and the eventual participation of a French Internaut in such a sale,
Yahoo! Inc. commits a fault on French territory.”  True, said the judge, “the unintentional
character [of Yahoo “fault”] is evident.”  But the sales were nonetheless “an offense to the
collective memory of a nation profoundly wounded by the atrocities committed in the name of
the Nazi criminal enterprise… and especially to its Jewish citizens.”
Could the ruling be applied?  Yes, declared Judge Gomez: “[T]he genuine difficulties
encountered by Yahoo!  do not constitute insurmountable obstacles.” His order went far
beyond the plaintiff’s demands: Yahoo! Inc. must now “take all measures of a nature to
dissuade and to render impossible all consultation on Yahoo.com of the online sale of Nazi
objects and of any other site or service that constitutes an apology of Nazism or a contestation
of Nazi crimes.”  A date of July 24 was set for Yahoo!’s presentation of those still-undefined
                                                
14 This statement  is based on a review of the Lexis-Nexis database.  It is interesting to note that in an April
17 story on “Weaving the Web in Paris,” Business Week found it more interesting that in France, unlike Silicon
Valley, “the locals smoke cigarettes in Internet cafés.”  Likewise, when CNN’s Internet-savvy “New Show”
discussed the international strategies of Yahoo! and eBay on April 25, the Paris affair never came up.
15 Christian Pecnard’s quotes are drawn from « Conclusions pour la Société Yahoo ! Inc., A Monsieur le
Président du Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris », Audience de référé du 15 mai 2000, pp. 4-10.
16 « Conclusions en réplique de L’Union des étudiants juif  de France, A Monsieur le Président du Tribunal
de Grande Instance de Paris », Audience de référé du 15 mai 2000  (via www.juriscom.net).
17 Interview with the authors, March 2, 2001.Yahoo! on Trial – November 2001 8
“measures.”
18 In the meanwhile, Gomez ordered Yahoo! to pay the costs of the hearing,
including the legal fees of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, plus $1,390 in provisional damages to the
LICRA and the UEJF.
The ruling turned the case into an international affair.  For the first time, leading English-
language media like the New York Times
19 and Los Angeles Times
20 covered the story.  There
was no lasting impact on Yahoo share price, which dipped from 126 to 118 on May 23,
rebounded to 122 the following day, and rose to 144 by June 7.  However, damage to the
brand was apparent, particularly in Europe.  As Wrenn said,  “We’re a global brand, not just a
U.S. brand.  And a lot of people just kept seeing ‘Yahoo!-Nazi’.”  Within the industry, rivals
profited from Yahoo!’s troubles to promote their own auctions, while content providers, said
Wrenn, “were not publicly behind us, because of the Nazi issue – they were saying, “it’s a
good fight, Yahoo! Go to it! We’re quietly behind you.’”  In short, the more publicity the case
received, the more Yahoo! was isolated.
1.6  The Chief Yahoo! Speaks
In early June 2000, Jerry Yang arrived in Paris for the inauguration of Yahoo! France’s new
offices, and was greeted by a call from the daily Libération requesting an interview.   The
subsidiary’s employees, at least one of whom had been pressured by her family to leave the
company over the issue, urged Yang to meet the reporter.
Yang’s interview with Eduard Launet appeared on June 16, 2000, under a bold-faced quote
that Yahoo! executives say was taken out of context: “The French court is very naïve.”  The
introduction presented Yang in an aggressive, defiant light: “Okay, he’ll respect the laws that
apply to his foreign subsidiaries, but it’s not okay to intervene on the site of yahoo.com [in]
the United States.  Not unless an American court so orders.”   In fact, this was not far from
Yang’s remarks as reported. Asked if Yahoo! Inc. would obey the French court’s orders,
Yang had replied: “This court wants to impose a judgment in a jurisdiction over which it has
no control…. Asking us to filter access to our content according to the nationality of an
internaut is very naïve.”  He went on to potray Yahoo! as a victim:
We don’t think that American values should apply everywhere…. It happens that
American style and business have been dominant until now [on the Internet].  But not
American values.  I am not the advocate of “Americanism.”  We have good and bad
points.  Every culture should be able to defend itself.  But you can’t impose your
values on the rest of the world.  If we’re talking about American imperialism, then
why can’t we talk about French imperialism in the LICRA case?…  Can you imagine
an American arriving in France and ordering, “French sites can’t say this or that”?
When asked what Yahoo! planned to do next, Yang answered that the company had no plans
to filter French access to its sites. He made a final, emotional plea on behalf of Yahoo!’s role
as a neutral provider of an open, free cyberspace: “I would like people to understand: We
                                                
18 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, UEJF et LICRA c. Yahoo ! Inc. Et Yahoo ! France, Ordonnance de
référé, 22 mai 2000 (via www.juriscom.net).
19 Associated Press, “French Court Says Yahoo Broke Racial Law”. New York Times, May 23, 2000,
Section C, p. 27.
20 Bloomberg News, “Yahoo Launches Stock Purchase Plan”. Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2000, Part C, p. 3.
Coverage of the French case constituted the second half of an article consecrated mainly to Yahoo stock market
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can’t favor one group of users over another.”
21  In succeeding days, the interview was widely
quoted in the French press, and “definitely made the PR worse,” according to Greg Wrenn.
1.7  Inside Internet Technology: Summer, 2000
Judge Gomez’s demand that Yahoo! “ render impossible” any and all consultation from
France of Nazi-related content had been met with resigned disbelief by Yahoo! Inc.  Said
Wrenn, “We knew it was impossible to do it, and we knew we’d have to come back and say
that.”  Christophe Pecnard did just that on July 24, when he informed the court that “Yahoo!
Inc. cannot obey the order of May 22.”
22  Gomez’s order ignored “the very nature of the
Internet,” he added.
23  Was not the Internet conceived and structured as “a space of freedom
without central control”?
24
Instead, Pecnard offered a compromise.  Yahoo! would advise French internauts that content
on the U.S. site might violate their laws.  It would encourage users to monitor sites, in order to
“make actors and users more responsible”.
25  It would contact the publisher of a web page that
offered the notorious anti-Semitic forgery, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, to see if he
warned users that the content was fake.  But Yahoo! Inc. refused to “act in one way or another
as a censor.”
26
Following the hearing, Wrenn invited Knobel and Lilti for a beer, and attempted to reach a
settlement.  But his offer was not what the plaintiffs wanted:
I said, “If what you’re trying to do is get racism off the Net, even if you win and shut
down Yahoo!, that won’t solve the problem.… the nature of the Internet is that the
sites will pop up elsewhere.  What you need to do is win the battle for people’s minds,
and get out your message, and let them know the tools they can use to stop their
children from seeing this.   Why don’t we talk about ways to get your ideas out –
promote your sites, get better tools to users – instead of trying to shut these other
things down?”  Lilti said, “That’s an American way of settling a dispute.”  And Marc
[Knobel] said, “No, you’ll find a way to do this blocking, and that’s what we want.”
On August 11, Judge Gomez named a panel of international experts to study the technical
issues pertaining to the filtering of French Internet users.  Yahoo!, which had helped to create
the Internet!, had failed to convince the court that it knew what it was talking about.
The “college of experts” appointed by Judge Gomez included Vinton  Cerf, an American
considered among the founders of the Internet, François Wallon, a French Internet authority,
and English Web expert Ben Laurie.  In court on Nov. 6, they agreed that no technical
measures could ensure that Yahoo! would succeed in keeping all French Internauts away from
                                                
21 A complete translation of the interview is available in Le Menestrel et Al. (2001b, exhibit 2).
22 « Conclusions pour la Société Yahoo ! Inc., A Monsieur le Président du Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris », Audience de référé du 24 juillet 2000, p. 5.
23 Op. cit., « Conclusions pour la Société Yahoo ! Inc…. 24 juillet 2000 », p. 5.
24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Ibid., p. 26.
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Nazi writings or objects.
27  However, the experts maintained that up to 80 percent of French
visitors could indeed be identified by through various techniques.
Under questioning, Vinton Cerf implied that the solutions envisioned by the court, such as
asking users to voluntarily identify their locations, were futile and dangerous:
[Users] can choose to lie about their locations.  [And] it might be considered a
violation of the right of privacy of European users, including French users, to request
this information.  Of course, if this information is required solely because of the
French Court Order, one might wonder on what grounds all users all over the world
are required to comply.
Prosecutor Pierre Dillange, representing the State, likewise asked the court to retreat:  “French
justice should rule within the limits of what is possible and doable.”
28   The plaintiffs
maintained their demands.
1.8  The Judge’s Last Word: Nov. 20, 2000
On Nov. 20, Judge Gomez asked, in his final order, how it was that Yahoo! Inc. could
“already refuse human organs, drugs, or works and objects related to pedophilia on its auction
site,” but could not do the same with Nazi objects.  The firm, he said, was avoiding “a moral
and ethical exigency that all democratic societies share.”
29 He allowed that Yahoo!’s French
subsidiary “had largely satisfied the letter and spirit” of his previous ruling.
30 But Yahoo! Inc.
was again ordered to pay $1390 to each of the plaintiffs, plus the expenses of the court and
the plaintiffs, and to satisfy the terms of Gomez’s previous order within three months, or pay
a fine of $13,900 per day thereafter.
31
The ruling was international front-page news, often accompanied by a headline linking the
words “Yahoo!” and “Nazi.”  However, Yahoo!’s belief that the affair was central to the
future of the Internet was widely amplified by editorial commentators in major newspapers.
The  International Herald Tribune  called the ruling “certain to reverberate through the
uncharted world of the Internet”.
32 The Financial Times quoted Nigel Hickson, head of the e-
business unit at the Confederation of British Industry: “Despite the obnoxious nature of the
[Nazi] material, this ruling sets a very bad precedent for the future development of services on
the Internet.”
33 An accompanying editorial warned that “similar cases in other countries….
Would be a sure way to hinder the growth of Internet business.”
34 The Wall Street Journal
                                                
27Looking back on the event, Ben Laurie wrote that the use of current techniques offered nothing more than a
“solution [that] is half-assed and trivially avoidable” by an experienced  Internaut. The text is online  at
http://www.apache-ssl.org/apology.html.     
28 Julie Krassovsky, “Procès Yahoo!, les experts, stars d’un jour. » www.transfert.net, Nov. 6, 2000.
29 Ibid., p. 18.
30 Ibid., p. 21.
31 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
32 Victoria Shannon, “French Court Tells Yahoo to Block Nazi Items on Site.”  International Herald Tribune,
Nov. 21, 2000, p. 1.
33 Jean Eaglesham and Robert Graham, “French Court Ruling hits Yahoo!” Financial Times, Nov. 21, 2000,
p. 1.
34 Anon., “Offensive Ruling.” Financial Times, Nov. 21, 2000, p. 20.Yahoo! on Trial – November 2001 11
saw “disastrous implications for free expression around the world,” and an open door “for
other countries to hold independent web site publishers or large corporations outside their
borders responsible under strict rules about illegal content.”
35
The day following the ruling, Yahoo!’s share price on the Nasdaq exchange dropped from
$48.87 to $41.68, and again to $38.18 on Nov. 22.  It rebounded to over $40 on Nov. 27, and
then slid below $37 the following day, simultaneous with the announcement that a Munich
prosecutor was investigating charges that Yahoo! Deutschland had sold copies of  Mein
Kampf, banned in Germany.
36  Yahoo! executives dismiss the notion that the stock slides were
related to its judicial woes.
37
1.9  Yahoo! Changes Jurisdiction: Nov. 2000-Jan. 2001
Before Gomez’s final ruling, Yahoo! executives in the U.S. and Europe had debated their
future strategy. Assuming that Gomez ruled against Yahoo! again, should the company appeal
his decision in France?   According to Wrenn:
The main issue was timing.  You don’t get the order stayed while you appeal,
you’re required to comply immediately.  It’s not that we had no chance to get a
stay, but we did not view the chances as favorable.  And we’re a public company.
We felt more confident about our ability to resolve the questions sooner in the
U.S. courts.
Instead, Yahoo! Inc. would file a complaint for declaratory relief before the U.S. courts,
which hold the sole power to enforce foreign judgements against an American corporation’s
U.S. assets. Yahoo! Inc. has no assets in France that could be seized by the plaintiffs.  And
Wrenn thought it would be difficult for the French to win in the U.S.:  “Our First Amendment
case is as strong as it gets….  If U.S. companies can be threatened by judgments in other
countries, that has a chilling effect on free speech.” Thus Yahoo! could shift the debate away
from Nazism, and toward the rights of Americans.
On Dec. 21, 2000, Yahoo! Inc. indeed filed suit in U.S. District Court, asking for a ruling that
Gomez’s orders “are not recognizable or enforceable” in the U.S., plus recovery of Yahoo
court costs and an injunction to prevent the French plaintiffs “from enforcing or attempting to
enforce the Paris Court’s [rulings in the U.S.].”
38  Knobel was enraged: “They’re still accusing
French justice.  [Supposedly] we’re in a banana republic, a totalitarian country.  It’s
disgusting.”
In a move decided at the same time as its legal strategy, on Jan. 6, 2001, Yahoo! Inc.
announced the removal of all objects related to Nazism from its auction sites, except some
140 collectible coins, stamps, and anti-Nazi books and films. However, on Jan. 22, another
French group, the Association of Friends of the Deported of Auschwitz and the Camps of
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High Silesia, filed criminal charges against Tim Koogle, CEO of Yahoo! Inc., for “justifying
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes of collaborating with the enemy [and] for
having deliberately maintained auctions of Nazi objects.”
39  Attached to the charges was proof
that the auctions had continued until Jan. 5, 2001. In March and April 2001, Tim Koogle
resigned as CEO and Chairman of Yahoo!, citing personal reasons. He remains a member of
the board of directors.
As Vinton Cerf commented in an interview with Libération, “We’re at the beginning of ten
years of conflicts.”
40
Part Two: A multi faceted analysis: Comparing principles
with reality
From the moment Yahoo! France learned of the press campaign initiated by Marc Knobel in
February 2000, the corporation took an essentially legalistic approach to the affair. We
therefore propose to begin by analyzing multi-jurisdictional issues. We will then move to
technical issues, followed by philosophical issues related to freedom of expression and its
regulation on the Internet. Business issues will be treated next, with special attention to
communication and managerial matters. For each type of issue, we present Yahoo!’s position
and the arguments behind it, to evaluate whether it conflicts or aligns with activists’ demands,
which in this case can reasonably serve as a proxy for social pressure. We then analyze the
ethics and the efficiency (in terms of corporate goals) of each position.
2.1 Is multi-jurisdictional compliance equal to no compliance?
Yahoo!’s position on the legal issues was based on two key lines of argument: First, Yahoo!
is not a content provider (and therefore not responsible for Nazi content on its sites); second,
its local sites should be governed by local laws.
The argument that Yahoo! neither created nor endorsed Nazi items or neo-Nazi sites that were
accessible through yahoo.com was not invented for the needs of its defense in this case.
Yahoo! viewed itself and the Internet as media freely created by their users, and was prepared
to fight for that concept.  Said Guillanton:
We don’t work the same way as a traditional medium.  We’re not a minority of
specialists who create content for a passive majority.  In most cases, we put tools
at the disposition of people so they can communicate; they’re the stars.  So groups
form around little centers of interest, like sports cars, and in certain cases, around
opinions like these  [i.e., hate groups].
Likewise, Yahoo!’s position that content on local sites should be governed by the laws of the
country where the site operates preceded the demands imposed by this case. Over the years,
Yahoo!  had developed nearly two dozen local sites around the world, aimed at specific
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audiences.  Content on these sites was calibrated to local legislation (and political reality).
Thus, noted Wrenn, on Yahoo!’s Chinese site, “You don’t get a lot of time to say, ‘The Dalai
Lama is a great guy.’” However, Yahoo! maintained that jurisdictions outside a given local
site’s home country could not regulate that site; therefore, American or French users were free
to say whatever they pleased about the Dalai Lama, regardless of what the Chinese authorities
considered permissible.  “We can work around local groups and mores,” said Wrenn.  “What
we can’t do is make different countries happy with content on every site.”
While Yahoo!’s principled reasoning is logically correct, it implicitly considers that all courts
and political authorities everywhere possess the same power to impose their judgments. In
practice, not all courts have the same powers.  As  Lilti pointed out in court, “American
jurisdictions systematically retain the application of the law of the country of reception [of
Internet-related content] – when the U.S. is concerned.”
41 And they do so in confidence that
their judgments will bear weight, because the U.S. is the major Internet market. Yahoo! would
certainly not have faced an equally urgent situation should the Taliban have asked an Afghan
court to force the company to remove all images of unveiled women from its various sites.
Nor are all causes as inflammatory, from a social perspective, as the “right” to sell Nazi
objects to a French public.  The point is not that Yahoo!’s principles are invalid, but that as a
practical matter, they are dependent on the context in which they are expressed and exercised.
In this case, Yahoo! seriously under-estimated the power of the French courts.  It likewise
overlooked certain contradictions in its “local content – local rules” principle, which were
nonetheless identified by its adversaries.  In an interview, Lilti said he was aware that Yahoo!
Inc. had removed certain Nazi-related content from its sites at the demand of the ADL. If
Yahoo! would do as much for an American non-profit group, why would it not do so for the
French, who could also be considered part of the company's international public?  Yahoo!’s
failure to do so implicitly denied the specific importance of the activists’ cause, precisely
because they are not American. But for the activists, the spread of extreme right movements
on the Internet is inescapably a universal problem – and that is precisely how Judge Gomez
treated it in his rulings.
The French court’s approach to this issue was to focus on the question of access.  The court
never denied that Yahoo! could host any content it wished in the U.S., but denied Yahoo!’s
right to distribute materials to the French that are forbidden under French law. That stance
effectively bypassed the question of whether Yahoo! is or is not a content provider  It also
turned the fact that a French court holds no jurisdiction over the U.S. into an advantage for the
plaintiffs: By the same token, the U.S. cannot force France to allow the distribution of
materials the latter considers illegal.  It was therefore Yahoo!’s responsibility to restrict access
to these materials.
Yahoo!’s principled refusal to consider the spread of hate content on the Internet as a
universal issue was thus doubly flawed, in a practical sense: It locked the company into a
losing battle over jurisdiction, at the same time that it fuelled further opposition from its
activist adversaries and public opinion. Likewise, Yahoo! would lose the battle over the issue
of whether it was possible to restrict access by French Internauts to a U.S. site.
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 2.2 Are perfect technical solutions necessary?
As we have seen, Judge Gomez’s initial demand that Yahoo! “ render impossible all
consultation” of the contested services from France was arguably unfeasible. There is reason
to believe that Gomez understood this point, not least because on May 22, 2000 he gave
Yahoo! two months to propose solutions. During those two months, Yahoo! concentrated on
developing arguments to show that obeying the judge’s order to the letter was technically
impossible.  Thus in the following hearing, Christian  Pecnard declared that blocking
techniques based on the IP (internet protocol) addresses of netsurfers – a method Gomez had
suggested on May 22
42 – would not satisfy the order as written.
43  Likewise, Pecnard argued
that blocking methods based on keyword searches would mostly penalize sites “favorable to
the cause of the struggle against racism and anti-semitism,” because they were indexed by the
same keywords used by neo-Nazis.
44
These arguments are true, so far as they go.  But though they respond directly to the text of
Gomez’s order, they do not address its spirit – which is to hamper access to Nazi content from
France.   Thus, the possibility that partial access-blocking solutions might be feasible was not
addressed by Yahoo!  Instead, Yahoo!  argued that since no technical solution could be
guaranteed as completely effective (i.e., blocking access by all French users to Nazi
materials), Yahoo! could not reasonably be expected to implement any solution.  The obvious
consequence was continued frontal conflict with the activists.  Less apparently, Yahoo’s
position implicitly critiqued the judge’s order: What is the rationale for ordaining a solution
that does not exist and cannot exist?
Ironically, Yahoo!’s response reinforced the judge’s position, as a matter of law and of public
opinion.  It virtually invited Gomez to appoint a neutral and irreproachable referee, namely
the college of experts. Their role was defined in a way that foretold Yahoo!’s defeat, because
they were asked not only if a technical solution were possible, but to what extent. The judge
thereby indicated that a less than perfect solution – which Yahoo! had not proposed – was
conceivably acceptable.  At that point, the plaintiffs could not lose on technical grounds,
assuming that a partial solution was indeed feasible. By the same token, the mere
demonstration that a partial solution could be implemented made it possible to accuse Yahoo!
– as Gomez did, explicitly, in his final order – of failing to demonstrate “even a little good
faith.”
Yahoo!’s position that any solution would be valid if, and only if, it complied perfectly with
Gomez’s first ordonnance may appear as a mere tactical error; but on an ethical level, it is
absolutely idealistic. That does not make it less of an error; for example, the fact that no ideal
solution exists to the problem of people murdering each other does not mean we should
tolerate homicide.  However, a similar line of argument is pervasive in business ethics – for
example, in the notion that “business cannot be ethical because it cannot be perfectly ethical.”
The essence of such arguments is the reduction of ethics to perfect compliance with a rule or
norm. This refers to a recurring ethical issue: Is a norm valid only if it is applicable in all
practical situations?  Conversely, should a norm be invalidated merely because it is not
universally applicable?
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From the start of the case, Judge Gomez answered in the negative – first by holding that  “the
genuine difficulties encountered by Yahoo! do not constitute insurmountable obstacles,” and
then by modifying his initial order in such a way that Yahoo! Inc. was no longer required to
completely “render impossible” access by the French to Nazi-related content on yahoo.com.
In so doing, he transformed  Yahoo!’s technical concerns into an escape act, in which
technical issues were used to avoid responsibility for the development of hate groups on the
Internet.  Along the way, Yahoo!’s credibility on technical issues was sacrificed.
Two elements contradict the conclusion that Yahoo! consciously used technical arguments
here to avoid legal and social responsibility, however.  First, it is extremely difficult for any
company to use its capabilities for technological innovation to imagine solutions that would
restrict its own activities. In general, private technological innovation is employed to generate
private benefits.  There may indeed be social benefits of the innovation, but they emerge
indirectly, and do not inevitably serve as a primary motivation for the creative activity.  In
Yahoo!’s case, its indisputably innovative role in popularizing the Internet is subject to the
necessity of creating profits for its shareholders.  Conversely, it can be argued (as the activists
did) that there is a globally positive impact for society in implementing a technology that
constrains certain aspects of the Internet.
Our second argument follows from the first: It was difficult for Yahoo! to view the technical
issues in any but an ideal sense, because its leaders (and most spectacularly, Jerry Yang)
thought that it is in principle ethically wrong to try to restrain the Internet’s free development.
Their position evoked the question: “Can it be good for society as a whole, directly or
indirectly, to regulate the Internet in any sense?” As a French proverb says, “the question
contains the response”: Technical solutions that might have partially satisfied the judge’s
demands are not worth considering, because by circumscribing the freedom of individuals to
use the Internet, they would have a negative impact on society.
2.3 Can freedom of expression be regulated?
It is striking that although most actors and observers of this affair interpreted it as a conflict
centered on the issue of freedom of expression, Yahoo! dealt with the issue only briefly, and
in passing, in its appearances before Judge Gomez.  However, both in and out of court,
Yahoo! repeatedly evoked its refusal to censor user-generated content.
The fact that much of  Yahoo!’s content is indeed user-generated underlies the claim of
executives like Philippe Guillanton that the portal bears no resemblance to a “traditional”
medium.  Yet Yahoo!’s insistence that it cannot “favor one group of users over another,” in
Yang’s phrase, resides on classic U.S. free speech doctrine, which holds that offensive speech
is the price a society must pay for freedom of expression.
45  Thus the First Amendment to the
U.S. constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.” In recent years the U.S. Supreme Court extended that protection to
the Internet in particularly strong terms.
46  In the U.S., Yahoo!’s stance may be said to align
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with society, rather than being socially controversial. The problem is that in the present case,
the exact same stance appears idealistic, if not ideological.
Yahoo! Inc.’s reliance on these principles extended to French executives like Guillanton, who
argued that the best defense against dangerous ideas is to subject them to open public debate –
and in particular, that allowing hate groups on the Internet exposes, rather than promotes
them. He said: “The Internet forces everyone to have a more skeptical approach, to be wary.
There’s a lot of crap, and the Internet forces you to put it aside. The tool imposes this
revolution.”  Thus the same technology that makes Internet possible reinforces, and can only
reinforce, the progress of truth.
The question, however, is not whether the position taken by Yahoo!  in defense of free
expression for its users is morally right or not.  What matters here is that for  Yahoo!’s
adversaries, its stance was not credible.  For example, during his interview with Libération,
Jerry Yang candidly admitted that in operating Yahoo! China, “on Chinese soil, we respect
censorship, including political matters.” Knobel later cited that passage to us from memory.
Moreover, the activists argued that defending free speech could not justify avoiding
responsibility for publicizing neo-Nazism.  Noted Lilti, “The first thing I did [in preparing the
case] was to read Yahoo!’s contractual conditions, which allow them to clean up their site.”
The free speech issue had another negative effect for Yahoo!: The firm could be – and was –
accused by its adversaries of seeking to create an immoral confusion between neo-Nazis and
anti-Nazi activists.
47  Its adversaries’ convictions were enflamed by accusations, in the media
and through private e-mails sent to  Knobel and the LICRA, that they were promoting
censorship.  In an editorial published by Libération soon after Yang’s interview in the same
journal, Knobel demanded:
Are we dangerous, we who dream of a Net cleansed of [the] merchants of hatred?…
Are we dangerous, or are the others?  Those who normalize Nazism on the Net?
Those who sell the weapons of barbarism as if they were selling socks?… Those who
fall silent when these pages promote hatred, discriminate, call for murder?
48
A further danger of relying on what can fairly be considered American principles was the loss
of Yahoo! France’s brand identity.  Guillanton was clearly aware of it :
One of our greatest successes in France was to have managed to insert ourselves
perfectly into the local tissue.  The site is very “Frenchy.”  Up until this affair,
when we asked focus groups questions about our identity, one in four people
thought we were a subsidiary of France Telecom, one in four thought we were
American, and the other half didn’t know…. It was terrible to be attacked [as
American] when we were really pioneers of localization.
The pre-eminence of Yahoo! Inc.’s role contributed to the impression that an American
company was advancing irrelevant ideals in the face of “barbarism”.  For Yahoo! Inc.’s ideals
are neither universal nor universally admired, even where free speech is concerned.  In
France, as in most European countries, public speech is far more closely regulated than in the
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United States.  The free and open debate of ideas is tempered, in Europe, by the belief and
experience that certain ideas can destroy public order, and with it any semblance of debate.
Thus the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and Citizen – a crucial summation of the
principles behind the Revolution of 1789 – guarantees the right of free speech, “except in
cases foreseen by the law,” which are in practice fairly numerous.  For example, it is illegal to
discuss the private lives of public figures, or to insult the President and foreign heads of
states.  It is also illegal under article 645 of the Penal Code, the statute under which Yahoo!
was prosecuted, to publish materials or to make public declarations that constitute an
“apology” for Nazi crimes.  Victims of Nazi crimes are permitted to initiate prosecutions by
the State of violations of article 645, an exceptional privilege in French jurisprudence.
Yahoo!’s implicit assumption that familiarity with the Internet would predispose others to
accept its position on free expression was belied by Judge Gomez.  He had studied the
Internet assiduously since Web cases started arriving in his courtroom in 1996, and had
concluded that it was promoting false ideas – which demanded attention from authorities:
From 1996 to 1999, people said that if you regulate the Internet, you’ll kill it.  My
answer resides in a very simple example: If you want to upload an application on
the Web that enables someone to get my credit card number, I don’t agree….
Some people try to make Internauts believe that the Web is totally free, without
any obligation – and we all know it’s not true.  In real life, my freedom stops
where the freedom of others begins.  On the Internet, it’s the same thing.
Even companies that benefit from a positive public image are very unlikely to be considered
credible when they justify their position in a conflictual situation by a philosophical or ethical
stance.  In particular, social responsibility does not alter the fact that the role of business is to
make profits.  Consequently, attempts by a company to portray its position as socially
responsible may well be regarded as mere promotional campaigns, if not hypocrisy.
49  (Lilti
told us flatly: “We’re not talking about free speech, we’re talking about commerce.”)  To
some extent, public suspicion about such attempts appears justified.  As shown by  Litman
(1999), free speech is hardly a working standard for e-business in the United States. Far from
sacrificing business interests in the defense of freedom of expression, New Economy
companies act in concert with the government to pass laws that restrict free speech and protect
their interests.
But was Yahoo! acting in defense of its sole interests? Put another way, were the business
interests of Yahoo! effectively supported by its principled positions on legal issues, technical
issues and freedom of expression?
2.4 e-business is still business
In a case of business ethics, it is unusual that most of the analysis can be conducted with little
reference to the purely commercial aspects of the case. However, Yahoo!  never
communicated specifically on the business dimensions of this affair, as if to strengthen the
notion that it was acting for moral reasons.
Yet at the moment this case erupted, the C2C (consumer to consumer) sector of the Internet,
including online auctions between individuals – an outgrowth of the online forums that first
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created a mass public for the Internet in general and Yahoo! in particular – was rising fast, led
by eBay, QXL and iBazar.  Within a single year, eBay's revenues, mainly derived from a fee
on transactions, practically doubled, from $150 million through the first nine months of 1999
to $297 million for the same period in 2000.  In the latter period, eBay’s gross profit was $225
million and net income reached $39 million.
50   In January 2001, Forrester  Research reported
that online auctions in Europe had passed the billion-Euro landmark, and would attain 8.8
billion Euros by 2005, with 62 percent of transactions taking place in C2C sites.
51
Yahoo! referred only indirectly to this aspect of the case, while underlining two points: That
visitors to its auctions placed objects on sale themselves, and that Yahoo! charged no fees or
commissions on transactions (in contrast to eBay).  Activity on the auction site could thus be
considered user-generated content.
Marc Knobel was aware of these elements before launching his anti-Yahoo! press campaign,
and was in no way deterred by them.  In fact, it is not necessary to earn money directly from
online auctions for such services to have direct business implications for an Internet content
or access provider. Advertising revenues are crucial to auction sites, and in particular for
Yahoo!, which in 1999 earned 90 percent of its overall revenues from advertising
52. Among
25 auction sites surveyed by Forrester, advertising generated an average 22 percent of
revenues, second only to commissions.  Auctions help to sell ad banners: The average visit on
eBay lasts 50 minutes, compared to 20 minutes for conventional online retailers.
53
Knobel perfectly understood this aspect of Yahoo!’s business. Toward the end of his press
campaign, during an interview with the French newsweekly L'Express, he suggested asking
Yahoo advertisers what they thought about the Nazi goods.  The reporter followed his advice:
Questioned and informed by  L'Express, Ford and Visa declared themselves
stupefied to discover that their banners are displayed on the same page as the SS.
“We aren't indifferent,” said Ford, “but what can we do? The laws governing the
Web are so complex.”  The London-based managers of Visa, however, claimed
they demanded that Yahoo! stop this 'abusive use' [of Visa's ads].
54
In short, the business dimension of the case was pervasive, continuous and unfavorable to
Yahoo! This was implicitly conceded a few days prior to Gomez’s final order, in Nov. 2000,
when  Yahoo!’s international leadership – CEO Tim  Koogle, Greg  Wrenn, Jerry Yang,
European general director  Fabiola  Arrendondo, Philippe  Guillanton, and others – held a
conference call on how to limit further damage from the case.  The first point they decided
was that Yahoo!’s auctions would no longer be a free service, run by and for users.  Auctions
would be a paying service, and Yahoo! would decide what was proper for sale.  Commented
Wrenn:
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 We were already thinking of changing.  We didn’t want to be seen as making money
off these things directly.  But we wanted to make it a quality shopping experience, less
of a flea market.…. to get fees, and make it more attractive to sellers.   We knew
people would think it was because of the lawsuit.  Then you just invite more lawsuits.
But you can’t let that be the reason to avoid what’s right for your business.
Until then, Yahoo! Inc. had avoided doing exactly that.  It is tempting to conclude that
Yahoo!’s belief that its principles were central to the future of the Internet, and therefore to its
own growth, precluded a strategy based on a narrower interpretation of its business interests.
In any case, that strategy would have led to the same resolution more quickly.
2.5 Internal and external communication: autonomy or control?
At the outset of the case, Philippe Guillanton and his Yahoo! France team were at once in the
front lines and without authority.  Guillanton recalled worrying, when the above-mentioned
article in L’Express appeared, “This feels like a complicated affair.” He added, “We could
have called the LICRA to say, ‘Listen, there’s a problem, but it’s not something we control
[emphasis added], can we talk about it?’”  He meant that Yahoo!  neither created nor
necessarily condoned user-generated content.
But it was also a fact that Yahoo! France did not determine corporate policy on user
complaints. When  Guillanton first contacted Yahoo! Inc. to discuss the matter, corporate
headquarters replied that the company received “five letters like that every day,” implying
there was no major cause for concern.  (One of the consequences of the case,  Guillanton
noted, was that requests from Paris for guidance now received closer attention.)  Later,
Yahoo!’s Paris staff wondered if Americans could appreciate the horrors of Nazism to the
same extent as the French. Said Yahoo! Inc.’s international communications director, Scott
Morris, whose mother is French: “From the cultural perspective, we [in California] didn’t all
understand how sensitive things would get when the word ‘Nazi’ was mentioned.  In France,
World War Two is yesterday.”
55
There is thus reason to think that in this case, corporate affairs and legal departments at the
headquarters level were too preoccupied, and not sensitive enough to local issues, to
appreciate the intensity of French concerns before the affair exploded.  We can only speculate
what might have happened if executives with authority to remove the Nazi items were in
contact with the activists early on.  However, Knobel said he was astonished that Yahoo!
made no attempt to contact him during the press campaign that preceded his legal assault.
Why did Yahoo! Inc. hold back?  The answer may be inherent in the legal approach to the
relation between business and society.  From this perspective, any initiative that follows the
direction set by activists may be a dangerous precedent. But a lawyerly perspective may
nonetheless preclude the opportunity to use activists as objective allies, who provide early
warning signs of social concerns.
Similar roadblocks appeared in Yahoo!’s relations with the media.  Recall that in the early
stages of the case, Yahoo! Inc. avoided public comment, in keeping with a corporate policy of
silence toward pending litigation. Jerry Yang’s interview in  Libération  was seen as an
opportunity to regain the initiative lost through this policy.  Said Wrenn,
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We needed people to understand that we didn’t do this thoughtlessly.  We realized we
were getting beat up.  LICRA and the others were very good – they didn’t want a
settlement, they wanted press and publicity for the issue.  So we had to get more
aggressive about doing interviews and getting the word out.
The assumption, in other words, was that Yahoo! could use the media to deliver a message.  It
is natural – and also standard counsel from media consultants – for a company leader to step
forward and deliver such a message in a crisis.  Clearly, no one within Yahoo! could defend
the company’s principles more articulately than Yang, who created them.  However, in
practical terms, Yang’s intervention revealed an understandable but profound ignorance of the
rules of public discourse in France.  While to an American his words might have seemed
refreshingly frank, for the French – and notably to Judge Gomez – they could appear merely
brutal.  Once again, Yahoo!’s principled efforts served to diminish its alignment with society.
Conclusion
One cannot help being struck by the fact that if Yahoo! had removed the offensive items from
its auction site in February 2000, instead of in January 2001, there would have been no case
and no damage to the company. In theory, a company can neither respond to, nor give in to all
pressures arising from society. But in practice, failure to appreciate the character of specific
social concerns can have serious consequences, as in this case.
The Yahoo! case illustrates how the emergence of new technologies creates an array of
problems that legislators and lawyers do not yet know how to regulate or solve. Often the
absence of precedents leaves them  ill-prepared to respond to pressure groups or societal
demands. The same vacuum invites corporations and their leaders not only to sharpen their
awareness of ethical dilemmas (to avoid being taken by surprise - particularly when one is
operating in a  multi-cultural global environment), but also to find a solution to those
dilemmas outside regulatory mechanisms. Approaches based on compliance may not be
adequate to handling such dilemmas within corporations.
By centralizing its response to the affair at the highest corporate and legal affairs level,
Yahoo! Inc. implicitly reduced business ethics to a compliance issue, and prevented itself
from responding adequately to new concerns voiced at the local level. This pattern is hardly
limited to the New Economy: Many companies require employees to ask their headquarters
before talking with journalists or activists, and approval may be difficult to obtain before
damage is done. We should not underestimate the extent to which activists learn to play on
such structural weakness. It is highly significant that as time went on, Yahoo!’s adversaries
became increasingly expert in the art of finding the firm’s weak points. Several Yahoo!
executives commented on the superb publicity skills of Knobel, without realizing that at the
outset, he lacked any experience of such confrontations. In effect, Yahoo! was training him.
This case allows us to identify a conflict between two ideological stances. The first, reflected
by Yahoo!, could be summarized as Good comes by itself, and this process should not be
constrained. The second, reflected by the activists’ position, is that the Evil occupies any
vacuum, and this process must be constrained. An ethical manager should be careful to avoid
principles that lock him into one of these positions; a wiser course would be to navigate
between the two. Principles are indeed necessary to guide such navigation. But in the case at
hand, the principles advanced by Yahoo!  were not accepted by all parties, nor were they
efficient in terms of the firm’s economic interests. A company can lose both the moral highYahoo! on Trial – November 2001 21
ground and profits by restricting its actions within limits imposed by principles that others
may neither understand nor share.
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